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IL 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JEROME B. GUINAND, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
PAUL T. WALTON and THO.MAS 
F. KEARNS, dba ALTON-
KEARNS, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 
11153 
Respondent And Cross -Appellant's Brief 
STATEMENT O:F THE KIND OF CASE 
Respondent commenced this action seeking to 
recover an undivided ten per cent interest in the lease-
hold interests, overrides, reversionary interests, working 
interests, mineral interests and all other assest, includ-
ing cash, of the partnership known as Walter-Kearns 
as of the date he terminated his employment with said 
partnership on May 31, 1965, together with an account-
ing for commissoins due as of said date. 
1 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LO"\VER COURT 
The case was tried below to the Court sitting with-
out a jury. The Court awarded to plaintiff an account-
ing for commissions earned and not paid, based upon 
three per cent of the gross sales price of any mineral 
interest or lease sold by plaintiff on behalf of the part-
nership, Walton-Kearns, together with interest on said 
sum from May 31, 1965, as provided by law (R. 57-
58). The Court also awarded to plaintiff an undivided 
ten per cent interest in all leases and mineral interests 
held by the partnership, Wal ton-Kearns, as of May 31, 
1965, and ordered an accounting to determine the sum 
defendants are indebted to plaintiff on the sale of leases 
or mineral interests held by the partnership as of May 
31, 1965, upon which the defendants have not paid the 
plaintiff the sum of ten per cent of the gross sales price 
of the said lease or mineral interest ( R. 57-58) . The 
Court also held that the writing of January 2, 1962, 
was not supported by consideration and is so vague 
as to be unenforceable and is not sufficiently definite 
as to be construed from its four corners (R. 54). 
Appelants, hereinafter referred to as defendants, 
appealed from the judgment of the lower court after 
denial of their motion for a new trial. Respondent, here-
inafter referred to as plaintiff, cross-appealed from the 
judgment of the Court below in relation to the various 
holdings of the Court in regard to the validity and 
enforceability of the writing of January 2, 1962 (R. 
72-A and 72-B). 
2 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of that part of the Court's 
judgment which holds that the writing of January 2, 
1962, is so vague as to be unenforceable and is not suf-
ficiently definite to be construed from its four corners, 
and that the said writing is not supported by considera-
tion. 
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff agrees, in general, with the Statement 
of Facts set forth in the brief of defendants. However, 
that are several points thta plaintiff feels should be 
clarified. Therefore, a brief Statement of Facts is 
herein set forth. 
Prior to the formation of the partnership consisting 
of Paul T. Walton and Thomas F. Kearns on Novem-
ber 1, 1955,the plaintiff was employed by Paul T. 
Wal ton and engaged generally in activities of a nature 
similar to those which were carried on by the partner-
ship after its formation ('Valton deposition, page 5, 
lines 10-12, and page 7, lines 1-7). At some date there-
after, it was clearly understood between the plaintiff 
and the defendants that he had an interest, at least in 
the leases held by the partnership, which interest was 
characterized as a two or three per cent carried working 
interest ('Valton deposition, page 9, lines 9 through 
12). At a later date it was further clearly understood 
between the parties that plaintiff had a five per cent 
interest, although it is not clear whether or not that 
3 
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interest was a carried working interest or some other 
type of interest. (Walton deposition, page II, lines 
14-22). It further appears, rather clearly, that it was 
the intention of the parties that plaintiff was to receive 
at least a ten per cent interest in the leases if he termi-
nated, and it would appear that this interest was abso-
lute and not a carried working interest against which 
there w~mld be any offset (Walton deposition, page 29, 
lines 9 through 17, and page 29, line 30, and page 30, 
lines l and 2) (R. 167-68). Although the agreement 
dated January 2, 1962, was not, in fact, signed on that 
date, it is admitted by all parties that at a prior date a 
discussion had been had between the plaintiff and the 
defendant Walton to the effect that plaintiff should 
have an increased interest in the partnership (R. 175 
and R. 154). In March of 1962, when plaintiff was 
about to depart to Europe and North Africa on a busi-
ness trip for the Walton-Kearns partnership, he re-
quested that a writing be given him reflecting his interest 
in the assets of Walton-Kearns ( R. 178). He told Mr. 
Walton that he had recently been married and that 
his wife did not know .what his interest was in the part-
nership assets, and that he felt that he should have 
something in writing before leaving on an extended 
trip (R. 179). Pursuant to that request, the defendant 
Walton arranged for the drafting of an agreement by 
counsel for defendants in this case (R. 179). A meeting 
was had the afternoon of March 13, 1962, at which 
the defendant, Walton, defendants' counsel, and his 
secretary and the plaintiff were present ( R. 179-180). 
4 
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The rough draft of the agreement, which has been in-
troduced as Exhibit D-4, was furnished to the plaintiff, 
as well as to all other persons present ( R. 180). The 
plaintiff testified that he made certain changes on Ex-
hibit D-4 as they were dictated by defendants' counsel, 
because some of the provisions as set forth in the original 
draft did not set forth the full facts and understanding 
that plaintiff had had with the defendants (R. 180). 
There is dispute in the testimony as to how the final 
agreement of January 2, 1962, a_dmitted in evidence 
as Exhibit P-3, came into its final form. However, there 
is no dispute about the fact that it was signed by both 
of the partners, Paul T. \Valton and Thomas F. 
Kearns. 
After receiving said document, plaintiff remained 
in the employment of the partnership for a period of 
three years and five months, until he left that employ-
ment and went into business for himself. It is undis-
puted that he had no obligation under the terms of the 
writing of January 2, 1962, to continue in the employ-
ment of the defendant, 'Valton-Kearns. The defendants 
rely heavily upon the original draft of the agreement 
of January 2, 1962, as it was interlined by the plaintiff. 
However, it is plaintiff's position that the agreement 
that is involved, to wit, the final document of January 
2, 1962, which was admittedly signed by the partners 
in 'Valton-Kearns, is the document which governs in 
this situation, and that it is clearly construable from 
its four corners and is clearly supported by considera-
tion. 
5 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE AGREEMENT CAN AND 
SHOULD BE CONSTRUED FRO.M ITS FOUR 
CORNERS. 
The document upon which the action below was 
brought and which is in evidence reads as follows: 
WALTON KEARNS 
Oil and Gas Properties 
1205 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Empire 4-4333 
January 2, 1962 
Mr. Jerome B. Guinand 
5623 Indian Rock Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Mr. Guinand: 
This letter is to confirm your ownership of an 
undivided ten per cent (IO%) interest in WAL-
TON -KEARNS, a co-partnership composed of 
Paul T. Walton and Thomas F. Kearns. This 
interest includes and is not in addition to the 
various interests from time to time heretofore 
acquired by you. 
Upon termination of your employment with 
the partnership for any cause whatsoever, your 
interest in the partnership will be determined 
and discharged as of said time without resulting 
in a dissolution of the partnership; and such in-
terest as may have theretofore been vested in you 
in specific properties shall become your separate 
6 
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property, subject to adjustments incident to your 
proportionate share of the then partnership in-
debtedness. 
Isl Paul T. Walton 
Isl Thomas F. Kearns 
Although the document bears the date of January 
2, 1962, by admission of all of the parties it was, in fact, 
executed and delivered at a later date and was back-
dated to January 2, 1962 (Walton deposition, page 
13, lines 4 through 18, and page 25, lines 12 through 
14). (R. 154 and R. 178-180). There is no dispute 
that plaintiff had been an employee of 'Valton-Kearns, 
a co-partnership composed of Paul T. Walton and 
Thmoas F. Kearns, since 1955 (Walton deposition, 
page 5, lines 13 and 14) . It is further not disputed 
that he acquired various interests in the partnership 
between 1955 and January 2, 1962 (Walton deposition, 
page 9, lines 9 through 12, and page 12, lines 6 through 
21) (R. 158, 159). The agreement of January 2, 1962, 
also refers to the interest that the plaintiff had previously 
acquired in the partnership. It is also undisputed that 
the plaintiff remained in the employment of the partner-
ship from the year 1955 until May 31, 1965, or for a 
period of approximately three years and five months 
after the date of the agreement which is the basis of 
this actoin, without any obligation in law or in fact to 
do so, and that immediately prior to January 2, 1962, 
or at such other date as the agreement was, in fact, 
entered into, he was employed by the co-partnership 
under an oral agreement without any terminattion 
7 
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date, and also without any obligation to continue said 
employment. 
The agreement of January 2, 1962, seems to be 
composed of rather simple language, which is not com-
plicated and should be construed on its face. 
The only possible conflict that can be found in the 
agreement is between the following two portions: 
"This letter is to confirm your ownership of an 
undivided ten per cent ( 10%) interest in WAL-
TON-KEARNS ... " 
(found in paragraph 1) and 
"Upon termination of your employment with 
the partnership for any cause whatsoever your 
interest in the partnership will be determined 
and discharged as of that date ... " 
In interpreting the meaning of this letter, there 
are certain standards and rules of interpretation that 
require, among other things, that if at all possible a 
construction of the agreement be reached which effects 
a valid contract. This principle is enunciated in Driggs 
v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 105 Utah 
417, 142 P. 2d 657 (1943) at 663, in which the Court, 
quoting from Schofield v. Zi~n's C.M.I., 85 Utah 281, 
39 P .2d 342, 96 ALR 1038 ( 1934) , states as fallows: 
"It is elemental, in construing a contract, that 
its purpose, its nature, and subject matter should 
be considered. A construction giving an instru-
ment a legal effect to accomplish its purpose will 
be adopted when it can reasonably be done, and 
8 
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between two possible constructions that will be 
adopted which establishes a valid contract." 
The Utah Courts have also adopted the commonly 
accepted rule that the ordinary and usual meanings of 
the words contained in a contract must be applied there-
to in construing it. Plain City Irrigation Company vs. 
Hooper Irrigation Company, 11Utah2d 188, 356 P. 2d 
625 (1960), recognizes this principle and the Court says 
as follows at page 627 of the Pacific Reporter: 
"The beginning point of interpretation of a 
contract is an examination of the language used 
in accordance with the ordinary and usual mean-
ing of the words used, and in case of uncertainty, 
the background circumstances may be looked 
to." 
It is also said in that case at page 628 as follows: 
"Generally, where there is doubt about the in-
terpretation of a contract, a fair and equitable 
result will be preferred over a harsh or unreason-
able one. And an interpretation that will produce 
an inequitable result will be adopted only where 
the contract so expressly and unequivocally so 
provides that there is no other reasonable inter-
pretation to be given it." 
The whole of the agreement must be considered 
and effect must be given to the entire agreement, if at 
all possible. See Gates v. Daynes, 3 Utah 2d 95, 279 
P. 2d 458 (1955) at page 462 of the Pacific Reporter, 
where the Court states: 
"The contract is not artfully drawn and ap-
9 
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pears to have been clrawn without outside assist-
ance. We are permitted only to construe the con-
tract so as to give effect to the entire agreement 
without ignoring any part thereof." 
In this same connection, it was said in Cornwall 
vs. Willow Creek Country Club, 13 Utah 2d 160, 369 
P. 2d 928 ( 1962), in construing the meaning of a con-
tract: 
"In interpreting a contract, the primary rule 
is to determine what the parties intended by what 
they said. The court may not add, ignore or dis-
card words in the process, but attempts to render 
certain the meaning of the provision in dispute 
by an objective and reasonable construction of 
the whole contract." 
Although the word "said" is used, the contract in 
question was in writing. 
A case of great interest herein is Maw v. Noble, 
IO Utah 2d 440, 354 P. 2d 121 (1960), in which it is 
recognized that, if there is uncertainty or ambiguity, 
the contract should be strictly construed against the 
drawer, but that before that rule is reached the Court 
must look realistically at the contract in the light of 
the circumstances surrounding its coming into existence 
and give effect to the intent of the parties, if it can 
be reasonably ascertained. This proposition is set forth 
m the following language from that case: 
"It may be a source of regret to the parties 
that the contract did not expressly state how the 
interest was to be handled. Not having done so, 
in adjusting the rights of the parties, it is neces-
10 
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sary to resort to established rules relating to 
the interpretation of contracts. We are in agree-
ment with the well-recognized rule urged by the 
defendants that where there is uncertainty or 
ambiguity the contract should be construed 
against him who draws it. But it is to be kept 
in mind that this rule applies only where there 
is some genuine lack of certainty, and not so 
strained or merely fanciful or wishful interpre-
tations that may be indulged in. The primary 
and a more fundamental rule is that the contract 
must be looked at realistically in the light of the 
circumstances under which it was entered into, 
and if the intent of the parties can be ascertained 
with reasonable certainty it must be given effect." 
In the event there are two apparently conflicting 
provisions, which is not admitted by the plaintiff, but 
which is contended in this case by the defendants, the 
rule set forth in H ardinge vs. Eimco, 1 Utah 2d 320, 
266 P. 2d 492 ( 1954), should be followed: 
"It is fundamental that if effect can be given 
to both of two apparently conflicting provisions 
in a reasonable reconciliation that interpretation 
will control. 'Villiston on Contracts, sec. 622." 
A most recent case, Seal vs. Tayco, Inc., 116 Utah 
2d 323, 400 P. 2d 503 ( 1965), contains a discussion 
which is apropos here. The Court was addressing itself 
to the problem of interpretation of a contract in which 
there were conflicting clauses and admittedly one of 
them was later in the contract, but also in small print. 
However, the principle remains the same. The Court 
there said: 
11 
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"In addressing this problem, certain principles 
should be kept in mind. The first is that in case 
of uncertainty as to the meaning of the contract 
it should be construed most strictly against its 
framer, Amsco. A particularized application of 
this well-recognized doctrine is that it seems 
manifestly unfair to permit one who formulates 
a contract to so fashion it as to mislead the other 
party by setting forth a clearly apparent promise 
or representation in order to induce acceptance, 
and then designedly 'burying' elsewhere in the 
document, in fine print, provisions which purport 
to limit or take away the promise, and/or pre-
clude recovery for failure to fulfill it." 
In Morgan vs. Child Cole and Company, 41 Utah 
562, 128 P. 521 (1912), this Court interpreted a con-
tract which was no less certain than the contract in 
question. In that case the plaintiff and defendant had 
entered into a written agreement that provided that 
the plaintiff should furnish the defendant information 
" ... concerning the property known as the Sioux Con-
solidated Mining Company ... " and that the defendant 
should purchase " ... about 40,000 shares of the capital 
stock of said company, or an investment of not to 
exceed $15,000.00 ... " and to equally divide the profits 
and share the loss. The defendant in that case urged 
the agreement was ambiguous and could not be en-
forced. The Court held the agreement did not contain 
an incurable ambiguity. 
In Pelton's Spudnuts vs. Doane, 120 Utah 366, 
234 P. 2d 852 (1951), this Court was faced with the 
question of whether a franchise contract which pro-
12 
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vided that five per cent of the gross spudnuts sales of 
the defendant should be spent for advertising, with 
21/2 per cent to be paid by the plaintiff and 21/2 per 
cent to be paid by the defendant, was too indefinite and 
uncertain to be enforced. The defendant did not pay 
any sum for the advertising, and on trial the lower 
court held that the provision was void on its face as 
"too indefinite and uncertain" and that it was unen-
forceable. On appeal, this Court held that the provision 
was neither indefinite or uncertain, and reversed for 
a new trial on other issues. Thus, this very Court has 
held that a percentage determination or formula for 
determining the amount to be paid in a given situation 
is not so indefinite or uncertain as to make an agreement 
unenforceable or ambiguous. 
Applying the above standards of construction to 
the agreement, and in particular to the language of 
the agreement most recently quoted above, the last part 
of which the defendants contend to be vague or un-
enforceable, it becomes apparent that the first sentence 
confirms to the plaintiff his ownership of ten per cent 
in Walton-Kearns. The second sentence merely desig-
nates the time the value of that interest will be com-
puted. At the time the agreement was entered into, it 
obviously would not have been possible to determine 
the dollar value of the ten per cent interest because the 
business was to be continued from and after that date, 
and its assets and liabilities would, without doubt, 
change. The only reasonable interpretation that can 
be placed upon the agreement is that at the time of 
13 
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the termination of plaintiff's employment the assets 
and liabilities of Walton-Kearns would be determined, 
the latter subtracted from the former, and ten per cent 
of that figure resulting is the value of the plaintiff's 
interest. The contentioa of defendants that the agree-
ment is vague .'.md unenforceable because there is no 
standard fixing or governing its meaning is absolutely 
negated by the language of the agreement itself. The 
standard as set forth therein is ten per cent of the assets, 
after deducting from the assets the partnership indebt-
edness as of the date of termination of employment 
of the plaintiff. Applying the rules of interpretation 
set forth herein to the plain language of the agreeme:r:it, 
it becomes obvious that there is no need of an addi-
tional standard and that the agreement carries with 
it all of the necessary elements for computing the de-
fendants' obligation to the plaintiff. Therefore, on the 
basis of the written instrument itself, judgment should 
be awarded in favor of plaintiff and against defendants, 
requiring an accounting based upon the determination 
of the assets of the partnership as of the date of the 
termination, less the partnership indebtedness, and ten 
per cent of said amount should be the value of plain-
tiff's interest. 
POINT II. THE AGREEMENT IS SUP-
PORTED BY ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION. 
In regard to the language of the agreement above 
set forth, it should be specifically noted that the first 
14 
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sentence reads, in part, as follows: 
"This letter is to confirm your ownership of an 
undivided ten per cent ( 10 3) interest in Wal-
ton-Kearns ... " (emphasis added) 
The document does not say that it specifically conveys, 
but speaks in terms of confirming, which by clear im-
plication means that it is reducing to writing a prior 
agreement between the parties. Now, it matters not 
whether we speak of consideration for the written 
document or whether we speak of consideration for the 
prior agreement between the parties which was reduced 
to the writing dated January 2, 1962. At least a portion 
of the consideration in either instance is the same, to wit: 
Guinand' s remaining in the employment of Walton-
Kearns. The defendants contend and the Court below 
was in error in holding that, without a term or tenure 
written into the contract, the plaintiff was free to termi-
nate at any time and thus gave no consideration for the 
ten per cent interest plaintiff received. The law is quite 
to the contrary, and the Court's attention is directed to 
35 Am. Jur. Section 12.1, found at page 37 of the 1968 
supplement, which says in part as follows: 
"It is elementary that the parties to a contract 
of employment, if they act upon a sufficient con-
sideration while the contract remains executory 
and before a breach of it occurs, may by a new 
and later agreement rescind it in whole or in 
part, alter or modify it in any respect, add to or 
supplement it, or replace it by a substitute. The 
latter agreement which may properly be called 
the secondary agreement, may be either one of 
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two different kinds: ( l) it may merely alter, 
modify or qualify the original agreement, or 
( 2) it may entirely supersede the original agree-
ment ... It has been variously held that the fol-
lowing consideration moving from the employee 
to the employer is sufficient to support a second-
ary agreement of employment; ... the continu-
ance of the employee in the services of his em-
ployer where he was under no contractual obli-
gation to remain ... Warren v. Mosher, 31 Ariz. 
33, 250 P. 354, 49 ALR 1311; Spicer v. Earl, 
41 Mich. 191, l NW 923, 32 Am. Rep. 152; Rob-
erts v Mays Mills, 184 NC 406, 114 S.E. 530, 
28 ALR 338; Scott v. J. F. Duthie & Co., 125 
Wash. 470, 216 P. 853, 28 ALR 328; Long v. 
Forbes, 58 Wyo. 533, 136 P.2d 242, 158 ALR 
224." (emphasis added) 
In this situation, assuming the defendants' conten-
tions to be correct, that is, that plaintiff had no obliga-
tion to continue in the employment after the agreement 
conveying the ten per cent to him was reached, the above 
authority clearly meets that situation and holds that 
the fact that he did continue in the employment is con-
sideration to support the employment agreement. He 
obviously had no obligation to continue in defendants' 
employ before the January 2, 1962 agreement. See 
Counter-Affidavit of defendant Walton dated Feb-
ruary 24, 1966, as follows: 
"That the plaitniff in the instant action had 
the right to terminate his employment with 'i\T al-
ton-Kearns at will, and that the writing of J anu-
ary 2, 1962, in no way altered, changed or com-
mitted him to any tenure of employment with 
Walton-Kearns." (R. 21-22) 
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The same rule is found in an annotation in 158 
ALR at 242, Section 4, in which all of the cases to that 
date are collected. The case to which the above annota-
tion is made is Long v. Forbes, 58 Wyo. 533, 136 P. 
2d 242 ( 1943), and is almost identical to the instant 
case. In that case there had been a contract to pay an 
employee an additional $50.00 per month, to be held 
for him until the termination of the contract, and the 
Court held against a contention that there was no con-
sideration for defendant's promise to pay the additional 
$50.00 per month as follows: 
"An employment of this sort which is termi-
nable at any time is subject to modification at 
any moment by either party as a condition of_its 
continuing at all. (Citing numerous cases and 
the Restatement of Contracts, Section 76, com-
ments ( c) ) . . . The doing of anything beyond 
what one is already bound to do, though of the 
same kind, and in the same transaction, may be 
a good consideration. Pollock on Contract, 10th 
Ed., 181; "\Villison on Contracts, Revised Ed., 
Section 102A." 
In a California case, Sabatini v. Hensley, 161 Cal. 
2d 172, 326 Pac. 2d 622, (1958), a situation very simi-
lar to the case at bar arose. In the Sabatini case, a for-: 
mer employee sued his former employer, seeking a bonus 
above his salary that had been promised by the em-
ployer. As in the instant case, there was no obligation 
for the employee to continue the employment. The 
Court held as follows: 
"'Vhen an employer promises a prospective 
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employee a fixed salary and an indeterminate 
bonus, each promise is made to induce undertak-
ing of the employment. Acceptance of the em-
ployment is consideration for the promise of a 
bonus, and this promise is enforceable .... We 
see no distinction where, as here, the promise is 
made after employment but is made to an em-
ployee who has not contracted to serve for a fixed 
term, and for the purpose of inducing him to 
remain an employee. Here no period of employ-
ment was specified. 
"Continuing an employment to which one is 
not bound by contract is as clearly consideration 
as is entering into the employment in the first 
place." 
In Sabatini, there was no specific amount specified 
according to the evidence, and the California Supreme 
Court held that failure to specify the amount or a 
formula for determining the amount to be paid does 
not render the contract too indefinite for enforcement, 
because under California law the standard is reason-
able worth pursuant to a California statute. In the 
instant case, we need not go to the extent of attempting 
to prove the value that was promised because there is 
a formula established, to wit: Ten per cent of all of 
the assets of the partnership, less ten per cent of the 
then partnership indebtedness, as of the date of termi-
nation of employment. 
We submit the cases above cited support the propo-
sition that the action of the plaintiff herein in continu-
ing in the employment of the defendant for a period of 
three years and five months after the date of the agree-
18 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ment is consideration for the promise made by the 
defendants. 
The above discussion should lay at rest any con-
tention that the arrangement evidence by the writing 
of January 2, 1962, by which plaintiff received the ten 
per cent interest in the partnership and continued in 
its employment is not supported by consideration. The 
case cited above, Long v. Forbes, supra, specifically 
noted and relied upon the Restatement of Agency for 
the proposition that employment without a term or 
tenure is employment terminable at any time. To thi~ 
same effect also see 161 ALR at 709, where it is quoted 
with approval from the Restatement of Agecny, Vol. 2, 
Section 422, as follows: 
"Unless otherwise agreed contractual prom-
ises by principal and agent to employ and to serve 
create obligations to employ and to serve which 
are terminable upon notice by either party." 
This ALR annotation goes on to say: 
"Since the rule is completely undisputed and 
supported by literally hundreds of cases, it has 
not been necessary to state any of the cases in 
detail." 
This rule, of course, by implication holds that the 
contract between the employer and employee is a valid 
contract, but that the services of the employee may be 
terminated by either employee or employer at any time, 
but, of course, that does not alter the consideration that 
the employee is to receive for the employment. 
Additional consideration here involved revolves 
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around the fact that the plaintiff had a prior interest in 
the partnership, or even assuming the position of 
the defendants, a five per cent interest in the leases 
that Walton-Kearns held prior to the agreement re-
flected by the writing of January 2, 1962. See Wal-
ton's deposition of February 4, 1966, page 12, line 
13. By that writing of January 2, 1962, the plaintiff 
gave up that interest in exchange for the interest set 
forth in that writing. The Court's attention is drawn 
to the writing of January 2, 1962, where it is said in 
the second !)entence of the first paragraph: 
"This interest includes and is not in addition 
to the various interests from time to time here-
tofore acquired by you." 
This is plainly consideration and is set forth on the 
face of the instrument. 
POINT III. THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT 
SHOULD BE INTERPRETED IN THE 
LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER 
WHICH IT WAS ENTERED INTO, AND EF-
FECT GIVEN TO THE INTENT OF THE 
PARTIES. 
The heading sets forth the rule found in Maw v. 
Noble (supra) . Although there is conflict in the evi-
dence as to how the final draft of the writing of January 
2, 1962, came into effect, there is more than sufficient 
evidence to believe that it was drafted by the attorney 
for the defendants. In the deposition of the defendant, 
Walton, taken January 4, 1966, at page 13, lines 19 
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and 20, is found the following: 
"Q. Now, do you recall who prepared that agree-
ment 1 (The agreement of January 2, 1962). 
"A. Yes, l\ilr. Gustin prepared it." 
It should be remembered that the above quotation 
from the mouth of the defendant, Walton, was taken 
at the time that the first deposition was taken in this 
matter, to wit: in February of 1966. Subsequently, at 
the time of trial, Mr. Walton stated that he had asked 
his attorney, Mr. Gustin, 
" ... as to how to go about giving Mr. Guinand 
as close to a partnership interest as we possibly 
could, that is being a partner, Mr. Gustin evolved 
this typewritten letter of January 2." ( R. 156) 
And subsequently the defendant, Walton, testified 
that Mr. Guinand made some changes in the original 
draft of the document as prepared by the defendants' 
attorney and presented it to Mr. Walton, who informed 
the plaintiff that if it was all right with Mr. Gustin, 
it was all right with the defendant. The defendant Wal-
ton states that thereafter the plaintiff went to Mr. Gus-
tin' s office and returned to the office of the defendants, 
where he had the document of January 2, 1962 typed by 
one of the secretaries and handed it to Mr. Walton, who 
signed it and who also procured the signature of Mr. 
Kearns. (R. 162-63) 
In conflict with this testimony is the testimony 
of the plaintiff, who stated that in March of 1962 the 
Exhibit D-4, which is the interlined original draft of 
the final agrement of January 2, 1962, was presented 
21 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to him at a meeting at which the plaintiff, Walton, 
hi.s attorney, .Mr. Gustin, and a secretary in Mr. Gustin's 
office were present, and that upon receiving the original 
draft, some discussions were had regarding the fact 
the original draft did not set forth the understanding 
that the plaintiff had had with Mr. Walton ( R. 124-
125). The plaintiff then testified that after discussing 
the matter for a while in l\ir. Gustins' office, Mr. Gus-
tin, defendants' attorney, dictated the changes and that 
the plaintiff wrote them in on his copy. He also stated 
that a copy of the document was available to all of 
those who were meeting at that time (R. 125). Con-
trary to the assertions of counsel for the defendant, the 
only testimony in the record under oath regarding the 
drafting of the agreement as to the fact that the plain-
tiff was told that it was simply an agreement to agree 
in the future is that of the plaintiff, where he denies 
on cross-examination that he was told that the agree-
ment would require another agreement when he ter-
minated his employment (R. 126). 
Walton admits in his testimony that plaintiff had 
advised him that he wished a writing to reflect his in-
terests in the assets of the partnership, because he had 
recently been married and was about to undertake a 
trip overseas for the partnership, and desired something 
to protect his wife's interests in the event that anything 
might occur to the plaintiff (R. 160). The plaintiff, 
in testifying as to how the agreement of January 2, 
1962, came into existence, stated that he had told Mr. 
Walton that, since he had recently been married and 
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his wife did not know what his interest was in Walton-
Kearns, he felt he should have something in writing 
before he left on an extended trip for the partnership, 
and that Walton agreed (R. 179). 
The plaintiff further testified that at the meeting 
held in March of 1962, out of which the agreement 
dated January 2, 1962 was developed, he wrote the 
changes as dictated by the defendants' attorney on the 
copy that had been furnished to him (R. 125 and R. 
181-182). He read those changes and was asked by Mr. 
Gustin if it was satisfactory. He further stated that 
he said as follows, "I guess it is, as long as it gives me 
an undivided ten per cent interest in everything Wal-
ton-Kearns has," and that Mr. Gustin said to him, 
"Isn't that what it says?'', to which the plaintiff replied, 
"I guess so," and that there was no further conversation 
at that time regarding the agreement (R. 182). The 
plaintiff also testified, which testimony is undisputed 
in the record by any statement under oath, that he at 
no time had any conversation with anybody in regard 
to the agreement of January 2, 1962, wherein it was 
described to him as an agreement to agree in the future 
(R. 186). 
It would thus appear without doubt that the plain-
tiff had asked the defendants for a writing setting forth 
an understanding which had been arrived at between 
the parties at an earlier date, that is, earlier than J anu-
ary 2, 1962, but that the meeting at which the writing 
was finally developed did not occur until the middle 
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of March, 1962. It also appears without dispute that 
the plaintiff had advised the defendant Walton that 
the reason he wished such a writin¥ was to protect his 
wife, who had no knowledge of his interest in the assets 
of Walton-Kearns, due tothe fact that he, the plaintiff, 
was embarking upon an extended trip out of the coun-
try on behalf of the partnership. 
It would seem to be an absolute exercise in futility 
for the plaintiff to insist upon a writing and then to 
accept it if he were advised that the agreement was 
simply an agreement to agree in the future, or, in the 
alternative, that it meant nothing, as alleged by Walton 
when he testified as follows on cross-examination: 
"Q. Did you talk to Mr. Gustin or anybody else 
before you signed it, after it had been draft-
ed in final form? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. You called Mr. Gustin, did you? 
"A. I don't know whether I called him or talked 
to him in his office. 
"Q. But you did talk to him about that agree-
ment? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And after receiving advice from Mr. Gustin 
or consulting with him in regard to it, you 
were willing to sign it? 
"A. Yes. Mr. Gustin told me that the agree-
ment did not mean a darn thing anyway, 
that we would have to have a final agree-
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ment when and if Jerry ever quit, so it did 
not mean anything to sign it." ( R. 163-
164) 
Following the rule set forth in Maw v. Noble 
(supra) earlier quoted to the effect that the agreement 
must be looked at realistically in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which it was entered into, and if the 
intent of the parties can be ascribed with reasonable 
certainty, it must be given effect, it does not comport 
with good judgment or with the normal behavior of 
human beings to go to the extent of coming to an agree-
ment between the parties, spend the time and effort 
necessary to draft a document, have a meeting in regard 
to it in which it is re-drafted, have it signed and then 
deliver it, if the parties at the time did not intend that 
the agreement meant what it stated on its face. At 
the time the agreement was entered into, obviously, 
the plaintiff and defendants were at least in theory act-
ing in good faith, a fact which Walton admits (Walton 
deposition page 30, line 24-25). If at that time they 
were, in fact, acting in good faith, then Walton or his 
counsel had an obligation to advise plaintiff that the 
agreement meant nothing, which, of course, as noted 
above, would be completely contrary to normal business 
practices and human experience where plaintiff was 
seeking an agreement which would protect his wife. 
Thus, it must be concluded that either the defendants 
were not acting in good faith and intended to mislead 
the plaintiff, or the agreement means what it states on 
its face. 
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Thus it is urged that when the agreement of J anu-
ary 2, 1962, is examined in the light of the circumstances 
surrounding its drafting, it becomes clear that the par-
ties intended to grant plaintiff a ten per cent interest 
in the assets of Walton-Kearns, less ten per cent of 
the partnership indebtedness as of the date he left the 
employment of Walton-Kearns. 
Any other interpretation of the undisputed facts 
surrounding the creation of the agreement would simply 
not comport with and, in fact, would be diametrically 
opposed to the expressed intentions of the parties in 
drafting said agreement. 
POINT IV. THE DISPUTED PORTIONS 
OF THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE MOST 
STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANTS. 
Assuming that the Court finds there is an ambi-
guity in the document as urged by the defendants, the 
amiguity arises from language admittedly a part of 
the original draft, which is Exhibit D-4, which was pre-
pared by defendants' counsel (Walton deposition, page 
13, lines 19 and 20). The language which plaintiff urges 
grants him a ten per cent interest in the assets of Wal-
ton-Kearns reads as follows: 
"This letter is to confirm your ownership of 
an undivided ten per cent interest in Walton-
Kearns, a co-partnership composed of Paul T. 
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and 
Walton and Thomas F. Kearns" 
"Upon termination of your employment with 
the partnership for any cause whatsoever, your 
interest in the partnership business will be de-
termined. . . " 
This language is contained in both the original draft 
and the final signed agreement of January 2, 1962, 
which is Exhibit P-3, and was the creation of defend-
ants' counsel. The balance of the language which was 
the changes shown on Exhibit D-4 and which, along 
with the quotations above, was incorporated into the 
final agreement, the plaintiff states was dictated to him 
by Mr. Gustin, the defendants' attorney, at a confer-
ence where the original draft was being discussed (R. 
124-125). 
Even assuming that the plaintiff authored the in-
terlineations, which plaintiff denies, nevertheless, the 
active or vital portions of the agreement are those 
which were originally the language of defendants' 
counsel, and under the rule found in Maw vs. Noble 
(supra) should be most strictly construed against the 
defendants. 
If the Court finds that the other portions of the 
agreement were, in fact, the creation of the plaintiff, 
he is willing to have them most strictly construed 
against him because they are the portions which protect 
Walton-Kearns, and plaintiff has no argument with 
being bound by them. By the same token, the granting 
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or vital portions of the agreement are those above quoted 
and should be most strictly construed against the de-
fendants under the same rule. 
POINT V. TIIE RECORD CLEARLY SUP-
PORTS THE AWARD TO THE PLAINTIFF 
OF A TEN PER CENT INTEREST IN ALL OF 
THE LEASES, LEASEHOLDS AND MIN-
ERAL INTERESTS HELD BY THE PART-
NERSHIP, AS OF THE DATE OF TERMI-
NATION OF EMPLOYMENT. 
In spite of defendants' position raising numerous 
technicalities regarding the parol evidence rule, the 
pre-trial order and the Statute of Frauds, it is the 
contention of the plaintiff that the defendants have 
clearly admitted as a matter of fact, under oath, that 
the very least that they have always recognized that 
plaintiff had a claim to was ten per cent of all the 
mineral interests, leaseholds and leases of the partner-
ship. See Walton deposition, page 29, lines 9 through 
30, and page 30, lines I through 15, where, in response 
to questions regarding the defendant Walton's intention 
as to what the plaintiff would receive, if anything, at 
the time he terminated his employment with the partner-
ship, Mr. Walton said: 
"Yes, JVIr. Guinand was to receive a ten per 
cent interest in the leases, most of which he al-
ready had his interest carved out by being 
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and, 
a record title owner." 
"If I understand the question correctly, Mr. 
Guinand' s interest would be ten per cent in the 
leases Walton-Kearns held at the time he left 
employment." 
See also the questions and answers as follows, found 
at page 30, lines 9 through 15: 
"Q. Let me rephrase it. As I understand your 
answer to my last question, if Mr. Guinand 
quit before there were production profits af-
ter expenses, your intention was he would 
have a ten per cent interest in the leases 
then held, that is, on the date of termina-
tion, by Walton-Kearns? 
"A. That is absolutely true. We went along on 
that from the very beginning." 
The same type of questioning was engaged in at 
the time of the trial of this case, and Walton admitted 
that, at the very least, even under his understanding of 
the agreement as he alleged it to be as of the time of 
trial, which apparently was changed from the time of 
the taking of his deposition, that the plaintiff was en-
titled to ten per cent of all the leasehold interests (R. 
167-168). Referring to the agreement of January 2, 
1962, Walton said as follows: 
"A. After this date there was no question. We 
have never quibbled on this. 
"Q. That is regardless of whose name it was in? 
"A. Right. 
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"Q. If he was the holder of record, ninety per 
cent belonged to the partnership and ten 
cent belonged to him? 
"A. In theory, yes. 
"Q. And exactly the opposite was the situation, 
too, if it was all in your name, ten per cent 
belonged to him? 
"A. That was the general situation. 
"Q. Upon dissolution - not a dissolution, upon 
the termination of Mr. Guinand' s employ-
ment with the company, is it not true that 
ten per cent would have been the figure that 
would have been used to determine whatever 
interest he had? I am not talking about 
whether it is net or gross, or whether you 
deduct anything from it or anything of the 
sort. I am just asking you, on whatever 
basis the division was to be made, his in-
terest was fixed at ten per cent by this 
agreement in your mind? 
"A. Yes." 
(R. 167-168) 
At approximately the time that the oral agreement 
which resulted in the written agreement of January 2, 
1962, was entered into, the plaintiff began taking leases 
on behalf of the partnership, with the consent of the 
defendants, showing in most instances that the plaintiff 
held a ten per cent interest in the leases (R. 175-178). 
Prior to the time that the agreement to increase the 
plaintiff's interest to ten per cent was reached, most 
of the leases were taken showing plaintiff to have a 
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five per cent interest (R. 175). This fact is admitted 
by the defendant Walton (R. 157-158). 
It, therefore, becomes very clear from the testi-
mony of the defendant Walton himself, as well as 
that of the plaintiff, that the award of the ten per cent 
interest in the minerals, mineral interests, leases and 
leasehold interests of the partnership to the plaintiff, 
as awarded by the Court below, is perfectly justified 
and supported by the evidence. If a reversal of that 
award were made, assuming the Court does not agree 
with plaintiff's proposition that the agreement itself 
provides that he is entitled to the ten per cent, upon a 
new trial below, it is difficult to see how the defendant 
could avoid the testimony above quoted and found in 
the record, which states the very position that the Court 
below found, to wit: that the plaintiff had always been 
regarded as the owner of, and was entitled to, a ten 
per cent interest in all of the minerals, mineral interests, 
leases and leaseholds held by the partnership as of the 
date of the plaintiff's termination with the partnership. 
POINT VI. THE DEFENDANTS CANNOT 
RAISE ON APPEAL QUESTIONS NOT 
RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS OR AT THE 
TRIAL. 
Assuming, but not agreeing, that the writing which 
is the basis of plaintiff's action is not a sufficient writing 
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to satisfy the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, which 
plaintiff urges is a sufficient writing, nevertheless, the 
defendants at this late date cannot raise the requirement 
of a writing under the Statute of Frauds. This matter 
was neither contained within the pleadings nor the pre-
trial order, and was raised for the first time by the de-
fendants' Motion for a New Trial or, in the Alternative, 
for Amendments of the Judgment and Other Relief, 
dated November 9, 1967 (R. 61-65). This Court has 
for so long held and has been so consistent in doing 
so that matters not raised in the pleadings nor put in 
issue at trial will not be considered on appeal, that to 
cite all of said cases would be mere redundancy. How-
ever, the Court recently in the case entitled In Re 
Estate of Ekker, 19 Utah 2d 44, 432 P. 2d 45 (1967), 
said of two points made on that appeal as follows: 
"Neither of the first two points were raised in 
the pleadings nor put in issue at the trial. There-
fore, they cannot be considered for the first time 
on this appeal." Citing Westerfield vs. Coop, 
6 Utah 2d 262, 3ll P. 2d 787; Delores Uranium 
Corp. v. Jones, 14 Utah 2d 280, 263 P. 2d 883; 
Nielson, et al. vs. Eisen, II6 Utah 343, 209 P.2d 
928. 
Two other cases to the same effect not cited above art' 
Huber v. Deep Creek Irrigation Co., 6 Utah 2d 15, 
305 P. 2d 478 (1956) and Hamilton vs. Salt Lake 
County Sewage Improvement District No. 1, 15 Utah 
2d 216, 390 P. 2d 235 ( 1964), where the Court said, 
at 236: 
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"We need not canvass matters raised for the 
first time on appeal." 
and cited therefor North Salt Lake vs. St.Joseph Water 
Company, 118 Utah 600, 223 P. 2d 577 (1950); In Re 
State in Interest of Woodward, 14 Utah 2d 336, 384 P. 
2d 110 (1963). 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully urged that this Court can and 
should on this appeal find that the agreement of January 
2, 1962, is a complete agreement between the parties 
and can be construed from its face, and that it is sup-
ported by consideration. The consideration is implicit 
on the face of the agreement where it is stated: 
"This interest includes and is not in addition 
to the various interests from time to time here-
tofore acquired by you." 
In addition, consideration is furnished by the ad-
mitted fact that the plaintiff remained in the employ-
ment of the defendants for a period of three years and 
five months after the date of the agreement, without 
any contractual obligation to do so. The agreement 
contains within it a formula for determining the interest 
to which the plaintiff is entitled, to wit: he is entitled to 
ten per cent of the assets of Walton-Kearns as of the 
date of his leaving the employment of Walton-Kearns, 
less ten per cent of the then partnership indebtedness. 
Upon making such a finding, this Court sets at rest all 
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of the contentions raised by the appellants. 
If the Court cannot construe the agreement from 
its four corners, then the plaintiff respectfully urges 
that the record is replete with enough evidence to con-
strue the agreement in the same manner and to the 
same eff cct as urged above. 
The plaintiff further contends that the evidence 
within the record is sufficient to sustain the trial Court's 
finding that he was entitled to at least a ten per cent 
interest in all of the mineral interests, leases, leaseholds, 
reversionary interests, working interests and overrides 
of the partnership as of the date of his termination, 
and further urges that under the well-established rule 
of law as provided by this Court, the question of the 
Statute of Frauds cannot be raised at this late date 
for the first time. 
Plaintiff also contends that there has been sufficient 
partial performance on his part, that is, the remaining 
in the employment of the defendants, to take any agree-
ment that might have required a writing out of the 
Statute of Frauds. 
The judgment below should be affirmed in relation 
to the award to the plaintiff of his commissions which 
are not in dispute on appeal and the award to him of 
the ten per cent mineral interests, which award should 
be merged into an award reversing the decision below 
in regard to the enforceability of the agreement of 
January 2, 1962, which agreement should be construed 
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and enforced by this Court and the cause remanded 
solely for an accounting under the terms of the agree-
ment of January 2, 1962, and an accounting for the 
commissions which are not in dispute on this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Richard H. Moffat 
1311 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant 
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